On social media, many people are saying the demographic cliff isn’t a big deal, people are just having kids later – and specifically asserting that more people can and are having kids at age 40+.
Except this is not true (facts rarely stop an Internet meme). Here is what Grok says about parent ages and births:
Per Grok, very few kids are born to parents age 40+ (data from 2021-2023, March of Dimes):
- Under age 20: Approximately 4.0% of children are born to mothers under 20
- Ages 20–29: Approximately 45.1%.
- Ages 30–39: Approximately 47.0%.
- Age 40 and above: Approximately 3.9%.
Other issues are that raising kids, especially many kids, takes the energy of youth. While most adults are still doing well in their 40s, by their 50s – when their kids would then be tweens and early teens, they tend to be slowing down. Injuries take longer to heal – and one may not fully recover back to the energy and activities of when they were younger.
No country offering incentives for more kids has seen a return to the 2.1 replacement level, nor did any see sustained increases in having children. In most cases, incentives caused families to have their kids sooner/younger – but still had the same 1-3 kids they were planning to have, thus no overall increase in numbers of children.
From Grok AI
Several countries have seen short-term TFR bumps from incentives, but these reverted without reaching or holding at 2.1:
- Sweden: The 1980s “speed premium” (extended parental leave benefits for closely spaced births) caused a temporary “baby boom,” pushing TFR from 1.61 to 2.14 between 1983 and 1990. However, this was mostly a timing effect (people having children sooner), and adjusted cohort fertility rose by only about 0.2. TFR fell back below 1.8 in the 1990s economic downturn and has hovered around 1.7–1.8 since, despite ongoing generous policies like subsidized childcare and gender-equal leave. economicstrategygroup.org +1
- Russia: The 2007 “maternity capital” program (a large cash grant for second or higher-order births) boosted TFR from 1.28 to 1.79 by 2016, with a tempo-adjusted increase of about 0.21. The effect was modest and short-lived, mainly advancing births; TFR has since declined to around 1.4, and cohort fertility stabilized below 2.1. unfpa.org
- Estonia: Expansions in parental leave (to full salary for up to 18 months starting in 2004) raised TFR from 1.37 to 1.72 between 2003 and 2010. Gains were tempo-driven and modest (stabilizing cohort fertility around 1.67), with no sustained rise to 2.1. unfpa.org
- Hungary: Aggressive incentives since 2010 (e.g., tax breaks for large families, housing subsidies, spending 5% of GDP on family support) increased TFR from 1.2 to about 1.6 by the mid-2010s, but it stabilized there and has recently dropped to around 1.4–1.5 amid economic pressures. No rebound to 2.1. ifstudies.org +1
- China: Shifting from one-child to two-child (2015) and three-child (2021) policies, plus subsidies and childcare expansions, failed to halt decline. TFR fell to around 1.0 by 2023, with any local birth rate spikes (e.g., 17% in some areas) being minor and temporary. Policies didn’t address root issues like high costs and gender roles. rand.org
Cases of Modest Stabilization (But Below 2.1)
Some countries with long-standing policies have maintained relatively higher TFRs without full rebounds:
- France: Comprehensive support (childcare, shorter workweeks, family allowances) has kept TFR around 1.8–1.9, higher than peers, but it peaked below 2.1 and has trended downward recently. unfpa.org +1
- Norway: Childcare expansions since the 1970s boosted completed fertility by 0.10–0.12 per 10% increase in availability, sustaining TFR above 1.7 but not reaching 2.1. unfpa.org
Potential Counterexamples? (None Hold Up)
- Israel: Often cited as a success with TFR around 3 (sustained above 2.1), but this isn’t primarily due to pro-natalist policies like child allowances or free IVF. High fertility stems from cultural and religious factors (e.g., ultra-Orthodox Jews averaging 6–7 children, strong family norms across society). Secular Jews’ TFR is around 2 or below, comparable to other developed countries, and policies have little direct influence on rates. reddit.com +5 Israel’s rates never fell below 2.1 to require a “rebound.”
- Czech Republic: TFR rose from 1.1 in 2000 to 1.83 by 2021 via policies, but this wasn’t sustained—it dropped to 1.49 by 2023. forbes.com +1
- Kazakhstan: Post-Soviet increases were tied to ethnic demographics and economic recovery, not policies, and TFR varies widely by group (not sustainably above 2.1 nationally due to policies). reddit.com
