{"id":4999,"date":"2020-02-09T21:44:04","date_gmt":"2020-02-09T21:44:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/3d.coldstreams.com\/?p=4999"},"modified":"2020-02-12T20:48:00","modified_gmt":"2020-02-12T20:48:00","slug":"faa-nprm-summary-of-key-points-and-recommendations-in-my-comments","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/coldstreams.com\/3d\/2020\/02\/09\/faa-nprm-summary-of-key-points-and-recommendations-in-my-comments\/","title":{"rendered":"FAA NPRM Summary of key points and recommendations, in my comments"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Updated on February 12, 2020.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Summary of Key Points and Recommendations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The NPRM eliminates\nmost indoor flights of small UAS<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The NPRM envisions\nthat only Remote ID compliant craft will be sold. Remote ID compliant craft are\nunable to take off if they cannot receive a GPS signal. As a GPS signal is not\nreceivable in most indoor locations, this de facto eliminates indoor flight of\nsmall UAS and implies the FAA is regulating the indoor airspace, over which it\nhas no jurisdiction. This indoor flight restriction violates PL 115-254 Sec.\n354. Or maybe not<\/em> \u2013 comments on Page 8 and 22 of the NPRM suggest anyone\ncan sell non-compliant drones by adding a \u201cFor indoor use only\u201d sticker since\nthe FAA cannot regulate indoor airspace nor the products on the shelf at Walmart.\nWhich makes much of this NPRM moot.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FAA\u2019s Proposed Use of FCC Part 15 Spectrum Will Cause Interference and\nCrashes<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The\nFAA proposes to use 47 CFR Part 15 of the FCC rules and regulations for\ntransmission of Remote ID broadcast beacon signals and requires that\ntransmitters \u201cmust be designed to maximize the range at which the broadcast\ncan be received<\/strong>\u201d. The requirement to \u201cmaximize the range\u201d mandates that\nsmall UAS transmit at the 4 w ERP level (1 watt spread spectrum, 6 db gain\nantenna) \u2013 from aircraft potentially located hundreds of feet in the air. This\nis not how Part 15 bands are intended to be used, will cause interference to\nresidential consumer devices, and may lead to receiver desense and loss of\nflight control signals, causing SUAS to crash, when multiple SUAS are flown in\nclose proximity to each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The FAA Envisions Using\nWi-Fi in a way that is Not Technically Feasible<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The NPRM proposes using Wi-Fi, if available, to log flights with the Remote ID USS, particularly with a presumably lower cost Limited Remote ID system. Small UAS that use a flight control app on the smart phone are communicating with the SUAS craft using Wi-Fi. Currently existing small UAS implement a Wi-Fi Access Point (AP) on the aircraft and the phone connects to this AP. The phone cannot simultaneously connect to a second AP that has Internet access; the phone can connect to only one AP at a time. Thus, Wi-Fi cannot be used to provide a Remote ID USS connection. The NPRM proposes a Limited Remote ID that appears intended for low cost consumer quadcopters that would be controlled via a smart phone flight control app, logging the flight to the Remote ID USS over Wi-Fi. As envisioned, this is not technically feasible. The flight control app would have to log the flight over a smart phone Mobile Data connection. This means the concept of a low cost Limited Remote ID small UAS is unobtainable. The Limited Remote ID should be dropped and replaced with a broadcast beacon Remote ID for Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) and Internet-based Remote ID USS retained only for Beyond Visual Line of Sight operations (BVLOS). Related: Based on my own tests, the addition of a Remote ID USS data logging app, transmitting once per second, may reduce smart phone battery capacity by 10%. When combined with a smart phone-based flight control app, this may drain 40-50% of the battery in 30 minutes of flying.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The NPRM violates\nthe Children\u2019s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

COPPA specifies\nstrict protections regarding the collection of data related to children,\nincluding geolocation data and data from \u201ctoys and Internet of Things\u201d. An age\nrestriction or permission from a parent or guardian to collect data does not\nresolve the problem. If a child flew a quad with or without permission, the\nparent or guardian is legally entitled to contact the data collector and ask to\nreview, delete or suspend future data collection. The NPRM, however requires\nlogged data be retained for at least six months \u2013 but COPPA applies to the\nFederal government \u2013 there is no exemption for the FAA. This is a problem for\nthe use of the Internet to log operator information to a Remote ID USS. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The NPRM violates\nthe 4th Amendment <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In the event a small UAS (SUAS) can receive a GPS signal indoors, when that SUAS is flown inside a home, it is required to log its activity in the Remote ID USS. The FAA is mandating the installation of a surveillance device inside a home, which lawyers tell me is not permitted by the 4th<\/sup> Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Others suggest there may conflicts with the 5th<\/sup> Amendment, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act prohibition on collecting electronic signals of Americans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Click the “Continued reading” link, here, to continue reading my full Summary of FAA NPRM Remote ID issues. There are a lot!<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

The NPRM assumes most\nusers have readily available Internet access via cellular service (or Wi-Fi,\nwhich is not feasible if low cost is a priority). In many areas of the U.S.,\ncellular service is limited; about half of my state\u2019s land mass has no coverage\nfrom my cellular service provider. The NPRM appears to define \u201cInternet is\navailable\u201d in a way that if another provider covers an area that my provider\ndoes not cover, then I am required to purchase service from that other\nprovider. Taken to an extreme, one could require contracts with multiple\nservice providers to meet the implied wording of the NPRM, or even mandate the\nuse of expensive satellite-based Internet access. This implied requirement is\nspurious considering the FAA defines a Standard Remote ID capability to fly\nwith a broadcast beacon Remote ID when no Internet is available, which is an\nadditional argument for a broadcast beacon Remote ID only (for non BVLOS\nflights).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The NPRM Defines an\nAerial Surveillance Network Using Remote ID USS<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The NPRM says data\nsent to and collected by a Remote ID USS is not restricted to the basic message\nelements of operator and craft identification and location. The FAA\nspecifically suggests a Remote ID USS could also collect \u201ca camera feed or telemetry data\u201d. <\/strong>Some future Remote ID USS vendors have suggested a \u201cfree\u201d business\nmodel; when the service is \u201cfree\u201d, private information is usually for sale. In\neffect, the NPRM is establishing a baseline for a national, real-time, aerial\nsurveillance network having significant implications for personal privacy,\nsafety, and violations of COPPA. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The NPRM Threatens National Security<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In January 2020, the U.S. Department of the\nInterior grounded all of its foreign made drones over concerns that such drones\ncould hypothetically conduct surveillance and transmit intelligence data over\nthe Internet[1]<\/a>. The US\nArmy grounded its Chinese-made drones in 2017 over fears of their use for\nespionage[2]<\/a>.\nWhile the left hand is citing threats to national security of Chinese-made\ndrones, the right hand is simultaneously mandating all drones be connected to\nthe Internet in real time, most of which will be made in China, and logging all\nkinds of data into Remote ID USS and other databases, for potential espionage\nuse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Is Privatization of Air Traffic Management Services Permitted?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Remote ID identifies a small UAS and also\ndelivers air traffic management (air traffic control) services. If a Remote ID\nUSS is not operating properly, the small UAS is not authorized to take off. If\nthe Remote ID USS malfunctions during flight, the small UAS shall be landed as\nsoon as possible. This is an air traffic control function. Additionally, the\nNPRM specifies that Remote ID USS location information collected will be used\nfor air traffic control purposes. The FAA has defined small UAS as identical to\n\u201caircraft\u201d. Thus, a function of Remote ID USS is air traffic control. In 2017,\nCongress considered a law to establish a privatized, third-party run,\nfee-for-service air traffic control system but did not approve of this concept.\nIf Congress said no to privatizing ATC, under what authority does the FAA set\nup a privatized ATC for UAS?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amateur Built Regulations Stifle Innovation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

I have met EAA members who built\nnewly designed aircraft, but test flew their designs as scale R\/C models. There\nare several Youtube channels where hobbyists are creating innovative flying\ncraft (for example, check out BPS.space and his \u201cSprite\u201d electric ducted fan\ncraft, currently test flown in his driveway). This NPRM would isolate testing\nat remote FRIAs, and eventually ban home designed and constructed aircraft.\nThis NPRM is a threat to U.S. innovation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Restrictions on Custom Built Model Aircraft Stifle Non-Aeronautical\nResearch and Business<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The restrictions imposed by this\nNPRM end the custom development of small UAS used in non-aeronautical research,\nsuch as agriculture, wildlife biology, forestry, geology and other areas.\nIncluding filmmaking. Custom built craft would be limited to FRIA sites \u2013 which\nis not the location where field research is undertaken. These small UAS will\nnever be manufactured products – and very few can afford to meet the strict\nrequirements for manufacturing one-off products. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Software-based Enforcement Prevents Using U.S.-Sold Drones Outside the U.S.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The\nFAA believes it can contain alleged risks by using software to automatically\ncontrol the operation of all small UAS \u2013 moving regulation from a trust and\nenforcement concept (as is done for all other laws) into enforcement by\nsoftware. Side effects include the elimination of indoor flight, 4th<\/sup>\nAmendment and COPPA privacy violations, and that drones sold in the U.S., but\noperated outside the U.S., will likely not be able to fly due to Internet\naccess limitations and that a Remote ID USS may not be available.  Travelers from the U.S would have to purchase\na drone, at their foreign destination, adding to compliance costs. And of\ncourse, they would bring those non-complaint drones back into the U.S.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Environmental Assessment Required<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

FAA\nOrder 1050.1F, Paragraph 1.8 says that \u201cThe FAA decision-making process must consider\nand disclose the potential impacts of a proposed action and its alternatives on\nthe quality of the human environment.\u201d This NPRM eventually suspends the use of\npotentially millions of existing model aircraft, flight control transmitters\nand batteries, resulting in the likely short-term trashing of millions of\npieces of electronics, with corresponding environmental impacts. This NPRM opens\nthe low altitude skies to automated drone delivery fleets that have impacts on\nnoise and quality of life. I was unable to locate an Environmental Assessment\nof these proposed rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The NPRM Bans Large Paper Airplanes Unless 14 CFR 1.1 is Modified<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Through\na quirk in the definitions of unmanned aircraft, and the requirements of this\nNPRM, the FAA bans the flight of hand launched paper airplanes and balsa wood\nairplanes except at FRIA model fields. While it is doubtful the FAA will enforce\nsuch a rule, this is a side effect of the proposed rules. This is fixable by a\nslight modification to the definitions used in 14 CFR 1.1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Personal Impacts of this NPRM<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

As\nmy existing fixed and rotor wing model aircraft would be suspended by this\nNPRM, I may have to trash perhaps $1,500 worth of aircraft and non-reusable\naccessories and flight controller transmitters. Because of my long interest in\naviation, and because of factors that may limit my access to flying manned\naircraft again, I turned to model aviation. But because of uncertainty\nintroduced by this NPRM, I have suspended further investment in R\/C model\naircraft. Additionally, this NPRM potentially eliminates a popular activity \u2013\nindoor flight \u2013 at our city\u2019s annual Aviation Day event designed to interest\nyouth in STEM subjects. This NPRM seems poised to close our nearly three\ndecades old model airfield due to its proximity to an airport and the FAA\u2019s\nundefined \u201csensitive area\u201d criteria for FRIAs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

General Recommendation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Consistent\nwith privacy laws, threats to national security created by this NPRM, the\nrequirement to allow indoor flights of small UAS, and that the FAA\u2019s envisioned\nuse of Wi-Fi for Limited Remote ID is not technically feasible, the FAA should\nadopt the following instead:<\/p>\n\n\n\n